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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee / Respondent, 
vs. 
TINA HARDING, 
Appellant / Petitioner, 
CaseNo.20100291-SC 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW, THIS CASE PRESENTS A FACTUAL 
AMBIGUITY THAT REQUIRES CLARIFICATION BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BEFORE THE SEARCH BECAUSE NO PERSON 
COULD REASONABLY CONCLUDE THE BAG IN QUESTION 
BELONGED TO THE DRIVER AND NOT TO HARDING 
Harding concurs that the analysis of whether an officer had permission to search a 
person's belongings, when permission appears to come from a third-party, turns on 
whether the officer's reliance on that permission is reasonable. See, Respondent Br. at 6-
7. Because courts uniformly review law enforcement conduct which implicates 
constitutional matters, however, this standard depends on objective facts. Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991); see also, State v. 
Harding, 2010 UT App 8, fflf 14, 18, 223 P.3d 1148. Therefore, it is imperative that this 
Court review the factual circumstances of this case in its analysis of whether the officer's 
actions were reasonable. 
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Here, the State claims that Harding failed to elucidate why the officer must have 
inquired further into the bag's ownership before he could reasonably rely on the driver's 
consent to search. Respondent Br. at 7. In justifying the officer's conduct, the State 
points three issues: 
(1) the bags were located in the storage area behind the back seat, an area, 
not unlike a trunk, which is typically controlled by the owner/driver; (2) 
there was nothing about the bags (like a label or identification tag) that 
suggested they did not, in fact, belong to the driver; and (3) neither the 
driver nor the passengers stated that the bags belonged to anyone other than 
the driver. 
Respondent Br. at 9-10. Harding takes exception to these facts as support for the 
conclusion that the officer's actions were reasonable. 
First, the location of the bag does not lend little support for the conclusion that the 
bag belonged to the driver and therefore it was reasonable to conclude that consent was 
legitimate. The State argues that because the bag was found in a storage area behind the 
back seat - much like a trunk - it is an item within the control of the owner/driver. While 
this argument is plausible, it is not reasonable to conclude, as the State implies, that this 
is the rule or even the truth in a majority of cases that bags inside of a vehicle are under 
the control of the driver—particularly where the bags are located in an open storage area 
like in this case as opposed to a closed/concealed trunk. Moreover, it is esecially 
noteworthy that in this case there were three other occupants besides the driver. Unless 
the officer was misinformed by the driver in claiming ownership of the bag it would 
clearly be unreasonable to conclude that the driver had either actual or even apparent 
authority to consent to a search of every item in the vehicle. Rather, a person faced with 
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the present ambiguity—ownership of the bag—would conclude that the bag, while it 
could belong to the driver, could also belong to one of the other three passengers. A 25% 
chance—clearly unreasonable to assume the bag belonged solely to the driver. 
Second, the State argues that the lack of proof is proof that the bag belonged to the 
driver and therefore it was reasonable to rely on the driver's consent. Specifically, the 
State claims that because the bags had no distinguishing feature pointing out true 
ownership, it was reasonable to conclude that the bag did not belong to anyone but the 
driver. Respondent Br. at 9-10. Again, the present facts certainly urge a prudent and 
reasonable person to conclude that an unlabeled bag in the presence of four people within 
an open vehicle would not belong solely to the driver. 
Here, the State's argument appears to be that because the bag was unlabeled, that a 
reasonable person was free to conclude it could not have belonged to another. This logic 
- the lack of proof that the bag did not belong to the driver is proof that it did belong to 
the driver - is erroneous and impractical. It is erroneous because the lack of labeling is 
not conclusive or even persuasive that the bag did belong to the driver; particularly 
because several people were in the vehicle at the time. It is impractical because at least 
some, if not most, bags do not have labeling on the exterior that informs law enforcement 
of ownership.1 The fact that the driver did not specifically identify the bag as hers, the 
1
 As a practical matter, Harding contends that items which are not labeled with the 
owner's name does not translate into a presumption of ownership. For example: Co-
workers, Albert and Bob, have engaged in a friendly intra-office wager where Albert bet 
Bob that the Brigham Young University basketball team would go undefeated. They 
wagered one another's lunch. Albert loses and tells Bob that he can eat his lunch, which 
is stored in the office refrigerator along with the lunches of the other co-workers. 
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location of the bag and the fact that three other people were present make the officer's 
presumption of authority unreasonable. 
Third, the State argues that because neither the driver nor the passengers disputed 
ownership of the bag, it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the bag did, in 
fact, belong to the driver. Appellee Br. at 9-10. Harding concedes that had the driver and 
the passengers been informed specifically that the bag in question was going to be 
searched, yet the search continued undisputed, and then perhaps the officer could 
reasonably conclude that the original consent. This is not the case, however. Again, the 
facts are that there were four passengers in the vehicle, the driver never claimed 
ownership to the bag and the bag was located behind Harding in the back seat. 
Additionally, when consent to look in the vehicle was obtained from the driver, she was 
outside the vehicle while Harding and the other two passengers were inside the vehicle. 
R. 112: 7-8, 14-15. Accordingly, the facts here indicate that the passengers were 
unaware of what the officers were doing and that the driver had consented to the search 
of the bag. The officer only requested that the passengers "step out of the vehicle" and 
told them to wait "with that other officer while [he] took a look in the vehicle." R. 112: 
15. There is no evidence that either the driver or any of the passengers, but particularly 
Harding, knew that the officers were going to search the bag. There is only evidence that 
the officer said he was going to look inside the vehicle. Therefore, they did not have the 
Relying on Albert's permission, Bob mistakenly chooses and eats Charlie's lunch. 
Harding contends Bob acted unreasonably when he presumed Charlie's lunch was 
Albert's, merely because it was located in the same refrigerator as Charlie's and other co-
workers' lunches. 
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opportunity to object to the search of the bag. Based on these facts, it is wholly 
unreasonable to conclude that the driver's consent included the bag, a bag that she did not 
own. 
The State's position urges this Court to affirm the court of appeal's conclusion that 
that unless an item clearly does not belong to the consenting driver, then it is reasonable 
for an officer to search that item. Respondent Br. at 10; Harding, 2010 UT 8, \ 18. This 
position, however, turns this consent analysis on its head. This standard would broaden 
government searches because a presumption of consent woiild be afforded to officers 
unless the facts clearly demonstrate otherwise. This Court has held that the State bears 
the burden of proffering facts that corroborate any claimed consent as an exception to the 
warrant requirement. See, State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 835 (Utah 1992) (holding that 
the "State bears the burden of proving common authority, aftd it must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence"). Rather than adopt the State's position, Harding argues, 
as the dissent points out, "in order for the State to justify th0 search, it must demonstrate 
that the facts known to [the officer] would nevertheless have caused a person of 
reasonable caution to conclude that the driver had [apparent authority." Harding, 2010 
UT App 8, % 25 (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
The consequences of the Court of appeals analysis i$ that defendants now bear the 
burden of proffering facts that negate, what appears to be, a search based on an officer's 
reasonable reliance of consent from a third party. This analysis, as put forth by the 
majority opinion, however, concludes appropriateness/reasonableness in light of 
ambiguous facts unless demonstrated otherwise. This shottld not be the case. Although 
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the State correctly cites Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990), 
for the proposition that "[bjecause many situations which confront officers in the course 
of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some 
mistakes on their part... [,]" the Supreme Court qualified that statement: "But the 
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their 
conclusions of probability." Here, the probabilities indicate that the officer's 
presumption that he had consent to search he bag was clearly unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Harding asks that this Court reverse the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, reverse her conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and remand this matter 
back to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her pleas may be withdrawn and 
the evidence suppressed. 
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